Factors That Influence Enrolment and Retention in

Ghana’ National Health Insurance Scheme by Kotoh, Agnes Millicent et al.
Factors That Influence Enrolment and Retention in 
Ghana’ National Health Insurance Scheme
Agnes Millicent Kotoh1*, Genevieve Cecilia Aryeetey1, Sjaak Van der Geest2
Abstract
Background: The government of Ghana introduced the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2004 with the goal 
of achieving universal coverage within 5 years. Evidence, however, shows that expanding NHIS coverage and especially 
retaining members have remained a challenge. A multilevel perspective was employed as a conceptual framework and 
methodological tool to examine why enrolment and retention in the NHIS remains low. 
Methods: A household survey was conducted after 20 months educational and promotional activities aimed at improving 
enrolment and retention rates in 15 communities in the Central and Eastern Regions (ERs) of Ghana. Observation, in-
depth interviews and informal conversations were used to collect qualitative data. Forty key informants (community 
members, health providers and district health insurance schemes’ [DHISs] staff) purposely selected from two case-
study communities in the Central Region (CR) were interviewed. Several community members, health providers and 
DHISs’ staff were also engaged in informal conversations in the other five communities in the region. Also, four staff 
of the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ghana Health Service (GHS) and National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) were 
engaged in in-depth interviews. Descriptive statistics was used to analyse quantitative data. Qualitative data was analysed 
using thematic content analysis.
Results: The results show that factors that influence enrolment and retention in the NHIS are multi-dimensional and cut 
across all stakeholders. People enrolled and renewed their membership because of NHIS’ benefits and health providers’ 
positive behaviour. Barriers to enrolment and retention included: poverty, traditional risk-sharing arrangements 
influence people to enrol or renew their membership only when they need healthcare, dissatisfaction about health 
providers’ behaviour and service delivery challenges. 
Conclusion: Given the multi-dimensional nature of barriers to enrolment and retention, we suggest that the NHIA 
should engage DHISs, health providers and other stakeholders to develop and implement intervention activities to 
eliminate corruption, shortage of drugs in health facilities and enforce the compulsory enrolment stated in the NHIS 
policy to move the scheme towards universal coverage. 
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Implications for policy makers
• Despite the fact that the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) has increased access to healthcare, it has not eliminated financial barrier 
to accessing services.
• Corrupt practices especially extra payment at health facilities and payment for drugs persist.
• Attaining universal coverage require appropriate interventions to address the issues of delay in claim payment and shortage of drugs.
• The  National Health Insurance Authority  (NHIA) should effectively engage national and local stakeholders to create systems to improve 
service delivery and ensure prompt payment of claims to enable health facilities meet insured patients’ drug needs. 
• The government should resource district health insurance schemes (DHISs) adequately to enable them deliver NHIS cards promptly. 
Implications for the public
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) is an effective means to increase healthcare access in low- and middle-income countries including 
Ghana but effective implementation to ensure the poor, the target of the scheme, benefit is needed. Exemption should be expanded to include poor 
households with large membership. Also, healthcare service delivery should be improved and the NHIS made attractive to both the rich and the poor. 
Intensive education is also needed to make people appreciate the operational principles of the NHIS and develop positive attitudes that will move the 
scheme towards universal coverage. Though social health insurance generates fierce political debates, our results show that Ghanaians are putting 
politics aside to enrol in the scheme. However, the politics that erupts after every election need to be stopped by appointing the chief executive as a 
public servant and not a political appointee who should leave office with a change in government. 
Key Messages 
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Background 
Over the last two decades many developing countries have 
been experimenting with social health insurance schemes 
(SHISs) to improve healthcare access. In Ghana, the National 
Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was introduced in 2004 
in response to the criticism that user-fees,[1] particularly 
cash and carry,[2] improved the quality of care and drug 
supply but denied many people access, especially vulnerable 
groups.1-4 
This criticism led many organisations including International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) proposing the establishment of a 
national health insurance (NHI) to improve healthcare 
access in Ghana. The Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) responded to this suggestion by contracting experts 
to make recommendations for creating a NHI organisation. 
They proposed the establishment of a centralised company 
to provide a compulsory social health insurance for all Social 
Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)[3] contributors 
and registered cocoa farmers. Rural-based community-
finance schemes were also proposed for non-formal sector 
workers. These proposals culminated in the establishment 
of community-based health insurance schemes (CBHISs) in 
the early 1990s with support of the Ministry of Health (MoH) 
and international donors. The National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) government also launched a pilot NHIS in four 
districts in Eastern Region (ER) in 1997. This scheme, though 
stalled, stimulated debate on the need to find an alternative 
sustainable healthcare financing system.5 The government, 
inspired by the modest success of some CBHISs continued the 
initiative of establishing a viable NHIS.5-7 But this vision was 
curtailed by a change in government in January 2001.
The main opposition party, New Patriotic Party (NPP), having 
made a commitment during the 2000 election campaign to 
implement the NHI, initiated the policy-making process. 
Consequently, the NHI Law (Act 650) was passed in 20038 and 
district health insurance schemes (DHISs) were established 
in all districts in the country. The NHIS became operational 
in March 2004 to replace cash-and-carry and ensure equity 
in healthcare access. The NHIS’ goal is: “Within the next five 
years, every resident in Ghana shall belong to a health insurance 
scheme that adequately covers him or her against out-of-pocket 
payment ….”9,10 The NHI Act specifies the specific diseases and 
healthcare services covered and not covered.11,12 However, the 
insured could only access healthcare in accredited facilities 
within the district where they registered. 
The NHIS premium is subsidised by 2.5% value added tax 
(VAT). The SSNIT contributors pay 2.5% of their contributions 
as premium (Table 1). Non-SSNIT contributors are expected 
to pay an income adjusted premium of between GH₵22 (about 
US$10) and GH₵48 (about US$22) per adult per annum; but 
in practice everybody pays the minimum. Exemptions are 
provided for vulnerable: children below 18 years, the elderly 
(70 years and above) and the core poor. Pregnant women and 
mentally challenged persons were added to the exemption 
category in 2008 and 2012 respectively.13,14 
The NHIS, the first nation-wide scheme in Africa initiated by 
a government, covers both formal and informal sector workers 
and operates under a nationalised system of service provision 
and financing with no co-payment. Healthcare is obtained 
from all public health, faith-based, quasi-government and 
some private health facilities, pharmacy and chemist shops 
that have been accredited and operate under contract with the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). 
The NHIA established and manages the National Health 
Insurance Fund (NHIF). Premium payment account for 5%, 
SSNIT 17.5%, VAT 73% and interest on investment 5.2% of 
NHIF’ inflows.15 The NHIS has become the dominant source 
of income for public health facilities; accounting for 79.4% of 
internally generated funds (IGF) in 2010.16 and reduces out-
of-pocket health expenditures (OOPHEs).17 
Ghana is a lower middle income country with estimated 
Table 1. Current Features and Operational Principles of the NHIS
Features Description
Administration
- DHISs are centrally administered by the NHIA but day-to-day administration is decentralised to the districts.
- NHIA functions as the insurer; provides NHIS cards and accreditation to service providers, negotiates benefit packages, 
cost of care, ensures quality service and pays service providers. 
Funding
- 2.5% VAT. 
- 2.5% SSNIT contribution. 
- Money allocated to the NHIF by Parliament.
- Income from investments.
- Premium from non-SSNIT contributors, registration and administrative fees.
- Donations from non-governmental organisation and individuals.
Membership - Membership is compulsory for all residents in Ghana; unless private health insurance membership can be shown .
Exemptions
- SSNIT pensioners, non-SSNIT contributors above 70 years, children below 18 years, pregnant women and mentally 
challenged persons.
Benefit package - Covers 95% of diseases reported in health facilities in Ghana.   
Payment to service providers - Pay service providers within four weeks of claim submission to DHISs. 
Supervision
- The NHIA regulates premium and registration fees.
- Health facilities submit quarterly reports to the NHIA.
- DHISs submit annual reports to the NHIA who audits their accounts. 
Abbreviations: DHISs, district health insurance schemes; NHIA, National Health Insurance Authority; VAT, value added tax; SSNIT, Social Security and National 
Insurance Trust; NHIF, National Health Insurance Fund; NHIS, National Health Insurance Scheme; NHIF, National Health Insurance Fund.
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gross domestic product (GDP) of US$38 617 billion.18 Tax 
constitute 14.9% of GDP in 2011.19 The proportion of GDP 
spent on health in 2014 wa 3.6%.18 The per capita expenditure 
on health was US$145.18 Per the 2010 Population and Housing 
Census, 71.1% of the population aged 15 years and above were 
economically active.20 The poverty incidence (PI) in 2012 was 
24.2% and poverty gap index 7.8%.21 
Access to healthcare has increased through the establishment 
of community-based health planning and services 
(CHPS)[4] zones nation-wide. However, human resource 
challenges persist. With the ratio of one doctor to 10 402 
and one nurse to 1599 persons in 2011,22 and other service 
delivery challenges, quality service is often comprised23 and 
the country continuous to experience poor health indicators. 
Infant mortality rate was 41 deaths per 1000 live births, under 
five mortality 60 deaths per 1000 live births in 201424 and 
maternal deaths (380 per 100 000 life births) in 2013.22 Life 
expectancy at birth in 2014 was 60.3 years and 62.5 year for 
males and females respectively. The literacy rate was 74.1%.20 
Though studies have consistently shown that NHIS provides 
quick access to healthcare,25,26 only 34% of the population 
was enrolled in 2011.27 In the light of the relatively low NHIS 
premium and exemptions for vulnerable groups, factors that 
undermine enrolment and retention in the scheme need to be 
explored. 
Previous studies attribute low enrolment in SHISs to poverty, 
inadequate information about health insurance and perceived 
poor quality of service.28-31 These researchers who often 
focused on one stakeholder, usually community members 
and used only quantitative methods, gain limited information 
about the phenomenon of low enrolment in SHISs. This study 
examined factors that influence enrolment and retention 
in the NHIS using a multi-level perspective (MLP) which 
emphasises engagement of stakeholders at different levels in 
studying healthcare32-34 to more convincing explanation to the 
phenomenon of low enrolment and high drop-out rate.
The word ‘level,’ a metaphor, refers to the international, 
national, regional and local tiers of social organisation.33 
Engaging actors and focusing on events at these levels is 
the objective of the MLP. The authors emphasised that the 
actors’ varied interest and events interact to affect a social 
phenomenon. We thus propose that in order to draw more 
convincing conclusions about why enrolment is low and 
retaining members in the NHIS a challenge, it is necessary to 
focus on both local and national stakeholders of the scheme, 
namely: community members, health providers, and staff of 
DHISs, the NHIA, Ghana Health Service (GHS) and MoH 
and use ethnographic tools in the study. The findings of this 
study will not only inform policy and intervention activities 
to move NHIS towards universal coverage, but also help other 
developing countries address problems confronting their 
SHISs. 
Methods
Study Sites
This ethnographic study was conducted in the Central Region 
(CR) and ER of Ghana. The two regions were strategically 
chosen to reflect the ecology (forest and coastal) and the main 
economic activity (agriculture) of Southern Ghana. The CR 
and ER had 70% and 72.7% economically active population 
aged 15 years and above.20 Unemployment rate was 8.1% and 
8.4%21 and poverty incidence (PI) 18.8% and 21.2% in the CR 
and ER respectively.21 The literacy rate in the CR and ER were 
81% and 78.2% respectively.20 
Each region has a regional hospital. All districts used in this 
study have a hospital, health centres, clinics and CHPS zones. 
Almost all communities fall within the 5-km radius proximity 
to a health facility. 
Some key health indicactors in the two regions for 2011 were: 
infant mortality (per 1000 live births) was 61 and 50, maternal 
mortality (deaths/100 000 live births) 520 and 538, and total 
fertility rate was 3.6% in the CR and ER respectively.21
Selection of Participants and Quantitative Data Collection
Since a health economist on the research project has discussed 
the sample size calculation in detail elsewhere,35 we limit 
ourselves to giving the sample size and the selection process, 
and discuss the qualitative method in this paper. The sample 
size of 3000 households for the whole project was based on 
80% power to detect a 5% difference in overall enrolment 
between intervention and control communities and 10% was 
added to cater for non-response rate; making the total sample 
3300 households (110 for each community).35
The survey sample was selected as follows. First, one census 
enumeration area (EA) referred to as community in this paper 
was randomly selected from each of the 30 districts with DHIS 
offices using computer generated random numbers. Second, 
all households were listed and 110 randomly selected. 
A structured questionnaire was administered to heads 
of households. The survey data was used to categorise 
the communities into 15 interventions and 15 controls; 
considering their socio-economic status (SES), NHIS status 
and rural/urban location. 
This paper is based on the follow-up survey carried out in 
March 2011 after exposing the intervention communities to 
20 monthly educational and promotional activities to ensure 
people have adequate knowledge of NHIS’s operational 
principles and benefit package. Qualitative data was collected 
between June 2009 and September 2011. The details of 
intervention activities are reported elsewhere.36
Quantitative Data Analysis
We used crosstabs to analyse enrolment status of individual 
household members, reasons for enrolling, not renewing 
membership and never enrolling. Chi-square test was used 
to determine the relationship between NHIS status, socio-
economic and perceived health status.
The health economists estimated the PI using household 
detailed monthly consumption expenditure on food and non-
food items and dwelling characteristics (eg, water supply and 
availability of electricity etc).37,38 These indicators conform 
to the definitions of poverty in the Ghana Living Standard 
Survey (GLSS) 6 data.21 The GLSS is an internationally 
accepted method for estimating PI in developing countries. 
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The estimated monthly household expenditure represented 
the total amount of money needed to meet food and non-food 
consumption requirements of households.21 These estimates 
were considered as proxies for household wealth. Principal 
component analysis, a statistical procedure used to determine 
weights for a linear index of a set of variables was employed 
to estimate households’ SES scores.39,40 The households were 
ranked into five wealth quintiles based on their SES scores 
(core poor, poor, average, rich and very rich).37,38 All the 
analysis was done in SPSS version 16. 
Key Informants and Qualitative Data Collection
Qualitative data was collected in seven communities in the 
CR by the first author using observation, in-depth interviews 
and informal conversations. She paid special attention to 
two strategically selected communities: an urban fishing 
community and a rural farming community in the forest zone 
and their respective health facilities and DHIS offices as case 
studies (Table 2). 
Forty local key informants were interviewed (20 from each case 
study site: 11 community members, 7 health providers and 2 
DHIS’ staff). In addition, four national level key informants 
(one each from the MoH and GHS headquarters and two 
from the NHIA) were interviewed. The community members 
were cautiously selected to ensure they fairly represent the 
target population: currently insured, previously insured and 
never insured. Educational level, SES and health status were 
also considered. Key informants who were health providers, 
staff of DHISs, GHS, NHIA and MoH were purposely selected 
based on their work schedule.
Several community members, health providers and DHISs’ 
staff who were not regarded as key informants were engaged 
in informal conversation in the seven communities in the 
CR. Informal conversation, unstructured spontaneous 
discussions with participants, provides the opportunity to ask 
pertinent questions on different occasions. This eliminates 
the possibility of participants adjusting their response on 
purpose or holding back information on sensitive issues that 
are critical to the study. 
Qualitative Data Analysis
Observations and conversations were jotted down and 
elaborated into field note books at the end of each day in 
line with standard ethnographic studies.41 Second, digitally 
recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim and subjected 
to content analysis to elicit the common themes emanating 
from the data. Third, typical comments by participants were 
condensed into meaningful summary statements and placed 
under the appropriate theme. Fourth, all authors reviewed the 
analysis to ensure that the themes and summary statements 
reflect the participants’ views. 
The data was collected at multiple levels using both 
quantitative and qualitative methods in order to capture what 
happens at various levels and uncover aspects of issues that 
are not immediately obvious.42 In this study, triangulation 
was used to verify responses by asking different categories 
of participants the same questions using interviews and 
informal conversation to capture all dimensions of factors 
that influence health insurance decisions.
Four main steps were taken to ensure validity and authenticity 
of the data collected. (1) The questionnaire and interview 
guide were translated using the back-translation method and 
pre-tested. (2) The first author conducted all interviews. (3) 
Triangulation was used to verify responses. (4) Self-reflection, 
etic[5] and emic[6] perspectives were used to ensure objectivity 
when writing the reports.
Results and Discussion
Background Characteristics of Households and Individuals 
Covered in the Survey
Of the 6790 individuals covered by the survey, 46.3% were 
under 18 years and 4% were 70 years and above. Females 
formed 52.5% (Table 3). These statistics roughly agree with 
the 2010 Population and Housing Census which reports that 
38.3% and 4.7% of the population were under 15 years and 65 
years and above respectively.20
Enrolment in the National Health Insurance Scheme and 
Membership Renewal 
Community members typically described the NHIS as: 
“A good arrangement that ensures everyone has access 
to healthcare.” However, this did not translate into high 
enrolment and regular renewal of membership. Of the 6790 
individuals covered by the survey, 40.3% were currently 
insured and 22.4% previously enrolled. 
Significant differences were observed between enrolment of 
poor and rich respondents as well as the sick and healthy. 
Lower enrolment was reported among the poor categories. Of 
the 1392 poorest individuals covered, 17.6% were currently 
insured compared to 44.4% out of the 1299 richest (P = .000). 
Table 2. Profile of Key Informants in Each Case Study Community and 
National Level
Position/Employment Number
Local Stakeholders (n = 20)
Community members
Fishermen or farmers 3
Traders/farmers 2
Unemployed 1
Traditional and Opinion Leaders 3
Religious Leaders 2
Health facility staff 
Staff Nurse 1
Community Health Nurse 1
Midwife 1
Medical Assistant 1
Physician 1
‘District Health 
Directorate’ staff
Disease Control Officer 1
DDHSs 1
DHIS staff
Public Relations Officer 1
Manager 1
National Level Stakeholders (n = 4)
MoH  1
GHS 1
NHIA 2
Abbreviations: DHIS, District Health Insurance Scheme; MoH, Ministry 
of Health; GHS, Ghana Health Service; NHIA, National Health Insurance 
Authority; DDHSs, District Director of Health Services. 
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Membership non-renewal rate was lower among the poor: 
poorest (15.4%) and richest (23.8%) (P = .000). 
Respondents with perceived poor health enrol and renew their 
membership compared to healthy respondents (P = .000). Out 
of the 145 respondents perceived as having poor health, 73% 
were currently insured and 10.8% previously insured while 
39.2% of the 6206 respondents with perceived good health 
were currently insured and 22.9% previously insured (Table 
4).
These statistics and qualitative data revealed factors that 
influence enrolment and retention in the NHIS are multi-
dimensional. The factors are discussed under two themes: 
enablers and barriers.
Enablers of Enrolment and Retention in the National Health 
Insurance Scheme 
Enablers are factors that inspired people to enrol and remain 
in the NHIS. These are benefits derived from the NHIS and 
positive health provider-patient interaction. 
Table 3. Background Characteristics of Households and Individuals 
Covered in the Survey
Overall (All Individuals), N = 6790 Percent 
Age, n = 6790
0-17 46.3
18-69 49.7
70+ 4.0
Gender, n = 6790
Male 47.5
Female 52.5
Highest level of education of heads of households, n =1562
None 26.3
Primary 20.6
Secondary 44.4
Tertiary 8.7
Marital status of heads of households, n = 1562
Single 9.0
Married 62.0
Divorce 6.8
Separated 5.5
Widowed 12.5
Cohabiting 4.2
Table 4. NHIS Status by Socio-Economic and Perceived Health Status
Currently Insured  Previously Insured Never Insured P
Overall N = 6790 40.3  22.4 37.3
Socio-economic categories N = 6790  
Poorest 1392 (20.5) 17.6  15.4 67.0 .000
Poor 1362 (20.1) 31.3 18.4 50.3
Average 1336 (19.7) 35.0 22.1 42.9
Rich 1401 (20.6) 46.4  23.7 29.9
Richest  1299 (19.1) 44.4  23.8 30.9
Perceived health status N = 6788
Good health 6206 (92.9) 39.2 22.9 37.9 .000
Average health  339 (5.0) 56.3 14.2 29.5
Poor health  145 (2.1) 73.0 10.8 16.2
Abbreviation: NHIS, National Health Insurance Scheme.
Benefits of the National Health Insurance Scheme
Community members mentioned that the NHIS gives access 
to healthcare and financial relief from catastrophic payments. 
An insured diabetic patient described NHIS’ benefits as: “The 
premium compared to the cost of healthcare is reasonable. I 
don’t have to spend all my money paying hospital bills. Insurance 
helps me get my drugs. I don’t have crises anymore.”
Health providers confirmed these assertions and added that 
they encouraged people to enrol because the NHIS reduces 
complications among insured patients. A physician described 
the NHIS’ benefits as: “One good thing about NHIS is that more 
people report to the hospital early with fewer complications and 
come for review regularly.”
Our survey results support these accounts and show that more 
than two-thirds of respondents across the five SES enrolled 
because the NHIS provides financial protection against ill 
health (Table 5). Our results corroborate the findings that 
the NHIS improved access to formal care,25,26 significantly 
reduced out-of-pocket payment (OOPP).43 Durairaj et al 
observed a decline in hospital deaths among insured patients 
owing to early treatment.26 These evidence underscore the 
importance of the NHIS as a safety net for residents in Ghana.
Positive Health Provider-Patent Interaction
Insured patients mentioned that they enrolled and remained 
in the NHIS because of some health providers’ positive 
behaviour towards them. One of them shared his experience 
as follows: “I registered because the physician assistant (PA) 
persuaded me to enrol. The first thing they ask you is whether 
you have insurance card.” The PA confirmed this assertion 
and said: “I show patients my insurance card and educate them 
about the benefits to encourage them to enrol and renew their 
membership regularly to enable them seek care early and avoid 
complications.” 
These comments indicate that when health providers behave 
favourably towards insured patients, people are encouraged 
to enrol. Thus, perceptions about quality of service ultimately 
influence people to enrol in SHISs.5 
Barriers to Enrolment and Retention in the NHIS at the 
Community Level
Barriers are factors that discourage people from enrolling 
in the NHIS and renewing their membership regularly. The 
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appreciation of the NHIS’ benefits was not marked by high 
enrolment and retention rates. Aside poverty, which is often 
reported in health economics literature as the main cause of 
low enrolment,28-31 this study reveals more hidden factors. 
These are influence of traditional risk-sharing arrangements, 
corruption among health providers, service delivery 
challenges and politics. 
Poverty/“No Money to Pay Premium” 
Though poverty contributes to low enrolment, it is only an 
important factor among the poorest and some poor households 
with many members. When community key informants were 
questioned about why enrolment and retention in the NHIS 
is low, ‘No money to pay premium’ was normally their first 
response. Our survey results confirmed the ‘No money to 
pay’ reason and show that 63.2% poor and 65.2% richest 
respondents did not renew their membership in the NHIS 
and 70.5% rich and 66.7% richest never enrolled because of 
‘poverty’ (Table 5) but when I engaged key informants and 
others who by local standards were not very poor in informal 
conversation, they gave additional reasons: ‘I’m not often sick’ 
and “I’m waiting for a while.” Critical analysis of their living 
conditions revealed that some poor household heads could 
pay the heavily subsidised premium for all their members 
but did not. I also observed that in many of the households, 
only those who needed healthcare were registered and 
renewed their membership regularly. So, I engaged them in 
discussions to explore their motives. Many participants stated 
that apart from the core poor and poor households with many 
dependants, low enrolment and retention was an attitudinal 
issue and not a matter of poverty. An uninsured cocoa farmer 
said: “It is sad that most of us can pay the premium but we don’t. 
I registered my children and wife because they need healthcare.”
I also observed that heads of households knew that OOPP is 
more expensive but waited and rushed to enrol or renew their 
membership for only members who needed healthcare. Also, 
the higher non-renewal rates among the average and rich 
categories in this study contrasts health economics literature 
in sub-Sahara Africa, which gives excessive weight to poverty 
as the main factor for low coverage of health insurance 
schemes.44,45 
Two explanations are here in place. First, ‘poverty’ is not only 
an issue of lack of money but also lack of control over one’s 
own life uncertainties. As a result, people wait until they need 
healthcare before enrolling. For example, the majority (65.2%) 
of the richest respondents said they could not renew their 
membership because of poverty. Secondly, the ‘no money to 
pay’ statement had little to do with lack of money. It was a 
socially acceptable response. 
That said, a critical analysis of the situation of some poor 
household heads who can pay the heavily subsidised premium 
but did not, revealed that the issue was beyond the premium. 
The poor do not have substantial income but due to the social 
responsibility of caring for close relatives in Ghana, the poor 
(usually the men) also have many dependents (their wives, 
children and other dependents) to enrol. Given their low 
income, enrolling all these dependents is unaffordable to 
them. A cocoa farmer and a father of six children (one above 
Table 5. Reasons for Enrolling, not Renewing Membership and Never Enrolling in the NHIS by SES
N = 1562 Poorest  Poor Average Rich  Richest
Reasons for enrolling in the NHIS, n = 619
Financial protection against illness 71.0 79.1 77.5 74.1 72.4
It a better than cash and carry 29.0 20.9 21.1 25.4 26.5
The school insured my child 0 0 1.4 0 0.6
Community opinion leaders asked me to join 0 0 0 0 0.6
Employer paid 0 0 0 0.5 0
Reasons for not renewing membership in the NHIS, n = 319
Could not afford renewal payment 75.0 63.2 65.5 56.6 65.2
Not satisfied with service 25.0 5.3 6.9 10.5 13.0
Difficulty in accessing services 0 5.3 3.4 5.3 4.3
No transport money 0 0 0 0 1.3
Inappropriate timing of premium payment 0 5.3 3.4 1.3 0
Had to buy drugs outside facility 0 0 10.5 2.6 6.9
Did not use service last year 0 21.0 10.3 18.4 6.6
Others 0 0 0 5.3 2.7
Reasons for never enrolling in the NHIS, n = 608
Cannot afford premium 100 96.8 61.3 70.5 66.7
Covered elsewhere 0 0 0 2.3 3.7
Mostly healthy do not need to be ensured 0 0 16.1 12.4 13.1
No scheme in the area 0 0 0 0 1.7
No close facility in the area 0 0 0 1.1 0
No confidence in the scheme 0 3.2 12.9 10.3 3.7
Registration point too far 0 0 3.2 0 7.4
Others 0 0 6.5 3.4 3.7
Abbreviations: NHIS, National Health Insurance Scheme; SES, socio-economic status.
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18 years) and two dependents above 18 years explained that 
he did not have money to pay for everybody so he enrolled his 
wife and four children who needed healthcare. 
In addition, all the poor who were engaged in informal 
conversation complained that the extra payments for 
healthcare services and drugs discouraged them from 
renewing their membership. A fisherman said: ‘We struggle 
to enrol but when we go to the hospital, we pay for drugs or 
are given prescription to look for the drugs in accredited 
pharmacy shops which we sometimes pay for. This discouraged 
many people from enrolling and renewing their membership.’ 
This supports the observation that compulsory or voluntary 
informal payment is a barrier to healthcare access for poor 
families; about 25% of healthcare users in Ghana pay illegal 
fees to public health providers.46 
Our results show that poverty as a barrier to enrolment and 
retention was most important only for the core poor. Some 
of them did menial jobs and did not have regular income. 
Others were totally unemployed and occasionally supported 
by family members and neighbours. The majority (75%) of 
previously enrolled and all never enrolled core poor said they 
could not afford the cost of premium (Table 6). Appraisal 
of the qualitative data revealed that some of them could not 
even enrol their sick household members or take them to the 
hospital. A health volunteer describes the situation of the core 
poor as:
“Many of the core poor do not have a stable source of income. 
They are occasionally supported by family members and 
friends. Even to get one meal a day is a problem. They cannot 
afford the cost of premium. Meanwhile they are not given 
exemption.”
A core poor woman explained why she could not enrol her 
household members as follows: “I do menial jobs and have no 
money to enrol my five children. One of them died because I 
had no money to take her to the hospital.” Our results thus 
provide credible evidence that the core poor, who need health 
insurance most, could genuinely not afford the premium and 
so need exemption. However, the exemption is not reaching 
them. None of the core poor I engaged in conversation in the 
seven communities visited benefitted from exemption. When 
I questioned DHIS staff why they do not grant exemption to 
the core poor, one of them said: “We need money so if we go 
about saying we want people to exempt they won’t pay and how 
do we get money?” Witter and Garshong also reported that 
only one per cent of the population were granted exemption 
in 2008.47 Our results corroborate WHO’s finding that 
exemption is crucial to ensure that the poor are enrolled in 
SHISs.48 But just like previous exemption policies which were 
not successful,49-51 the purpose of the NHIS as a safety net has 
failed to reach the poor and ensure that they have access to 
healthcare when sick. 
Negative Influence of Traditional Risk-Sharing Arrangements 
The fact that people quickly enrolled or renewed their 
membership when sick, indicates that they accept the NHIS as 
better than OOPP, but devised strategies to derive maximum 
benefit with minimal contribution. Almost all non-SSNIT 
members including the richest pay the minimum premium. 
An uninsured cocoa farmer provided insight into the actual 
situation in the following comment: “Most of us can enrol and 
renew our membership during harvest time but we do not. We 
wait until we are seriously sick and rush to pay the minimum 
premium.” I also met people who enrolled because they 
needed healthcare. During one of my routine observational 
visits to a DHIS office, I met a man who looked desperate and 
asked him what was wrong. He responded angrily: “Madam I 
thought I didn’t need health insurance till I fell sick. Now I have 
registered and need the card for surgery but its delaying.” 
Our survey results support these comments and show 
that those who perceive themselves as healthy enrol less 
and have higher drop-out rate: 39.2% with perceived good 
health were currently insured and 22.9% previously insured 
compared to 73% with poor health status being currently 
insured and 10.8% previously enrolled (P = .000) (Table 4). 
This corroborates Kusi and colleagues’ finding in their 2011 
study in three districts across Ghana that 73.9% of household 
members whose perceived health status was poor were likely 
to be insured compared to 49.2% with excellent health.31 
Also, the 2014 nation-wide Demographic and Health Survey 
(DHS) reported that 48% and 62% of men and women 
respectively were currently enrolled. It must however be 
noted that the DHS covers only women of reproductive 
age (15-49 years) who enjoy free enrolment for pregnant 
women. Therefore, the 62% enrolment for women is not 
representative of all women. The survey also reported that 1% 
of the respondents were covered by other types of insurance.24 
Blanchet et al also found that less than 25% of women under 
30 years and about 45% over the age of 60 were enrolled in 
the NHIS.52 These results indicate that low enrolment is a 
country-wide phenomenon. The question then is: Is it really 
the case that 65.2% of richest previously enrolled and 66.7% 
richest never enrolled respondents genuinely could not pay 
the heavily subsidised premium? 
All key informants attributed low enrolment and high drop-
Table 6. Opinion Related to Quality of Service
N = 1562
Currently Insured (n = 619) Previously Insured (n = 319) Never Insured (n = 608)
Agree Neutral  Disagree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree  Agree  Neutral  Disagree
The insured still have to buy drugs 64.0  11.6  24.4  58.2  10.8  31.0  50.0  19.8  30.2
Attitude of health staff should be improved 76.6  14.7  8.7  87.0  9.6  3.4  74.7  18.3  7.0 
Availability of drugs should be improved 83.7  11.2  5.1  90.1  7.1  2.8  78.6  17.7  3.7
Expect prompt treatment at the facility 75.8  11.4  12.8  68.8 18.5  12.7  64.7  21.6  13.8
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out rate to the negative influence of traditional risk-sharing 
arrangements used to manage livelihood activities and life 
events. An analysis of the operations of two of such groups: 
‘Pataase’[7] in fishing communities and ‘Nnoboa’[8] in farming 
communities shows that though they have health insurance 
elements, their risk-sharing principles are not the same. People 
join ‘Nnoboa’ when they need support on their farms and pull 
out from the group until another farming season. Benefits are 
commensurate to one’s contribution and not need. ‘Pataase’ 
focus on life events, mainly death. People join and remain in 
‘Pataase’ because they are sure of benefitting. The benefits 
cover the funeral cost of members, their spouse, children and 
parents. A member argued: “Death is a certain event but for 
ill health, you may or may not fall sick.” A community leader 
explained low enrolment in the NHIS and retention as follows:
“Health insurance is not part of our culture. People join 
‘Nnoboa’ if they need help in their farms. Benefits are 
according to one’s contribution. You remain a member only 
when there is work to be done.”
These arguments show that though solidarity and reciprocity 
are predominant features of both traditional risk-sharing 
arrangements and health insurance, the former do not 
help convince people to join and remain in the NHIS when 
healthy. Platteau’s review of concepts underlying traditional 
risk-sharing reveal that traditional mutual support schemes 
are based on balanced reciprocity (people receive as much 
benefit as they contribute),53 while insurance is based on 
conditional reciprocity (members receive a return only if they 
fall sick). Our study shows that people’s reaction to health 
insurance is influenced by the principles of traditional risk-
sharing arrangements. The logic of not enrolling was that 
people perceive NHIS’ benefits as limited to the individual 
so their investment might not benefit them. As contended, 
a well-established cultural perspective limits the possibilities 
for thinking and acting in new situations.54 Our study 
also shows that existing knowledge and practices largely 
determine one’s reaction to new policies and not simply its 
benefits. The incentive for enrolling in the NHIS is largely 
informed by the motive of benefitting and not of sharing 
cost so people enrol when sick and opt out when well. This 
undermine the fundamental principle of health insurance; 
regular contribution into a common fund based on income, 
whether one benefits or not. 
Accusation of Corruption Among Health Providers
Community members mentioned that health workers exploit 
insured patients. They cited illegal payments for drugs and 
other services.
Payment of Illegal Fees 
Throughout the fieldwork, the issue of extra payments 
by insured patients was prevalent. During an informal 
conversation, an insured woman narrated her experience at a 
health facility as follows: 
“I went to the hospital in the evening because of a sudden 
stomach pain. The nurse refused to accept my insurance card 
because I was late and demanded cash. I left and bought 
drugs from the chemist shop. I can go and show you the 
nurse.”
I could not follow it up, but I asked a nurse from the facility 
to react to the complaint. She replied: “I won’t deny it. Some 
of us ask insured patients to pay cash because we don’t want 
to fill the complex insurance form.” In another incident, a 
health volunteer called me to intervene and collect money 
an insured patient was forced to pay. I followed-up to have 
concrete evidence to support the earlier reports I had received. 
The provider gave ‘a face-saving’ explanation and quickly 
refunded the money. 
Payment for Drugs Inside and Outside Health Facilities
Paying for drugs was a common complaint among insured 
patients. A community member told me: “I had to pay for 
malaria drugs even though I know it is wrong.” Though some 
health providers denied these allegations, others confirmed 
the practice and lamented on how these undermined the 
NHIS’ credibility. One of them said: “Some of us sell drugs 
that are covered by the NHIS to insured patients, ‘pocket the 
money’ and charge the DHISs.” A medical officer confirmed 
the allegations and said: “One of my patients reported to the 
nurse that she was not given all her drugs but given prescription 
to look for it outside. We followed-up and found that it was true, 
yet the DHIS was billed.”
To explore these allegations further, I asked DHIS officials for 
their reaction. One of them lamented: “Collecting illegal fees 
and payment for drugs undermine our efforts. Some of the people 
we struggle to enrol do not renew their membership because of 
the extra payments.” These assertions support the evidence 
that payment of unauthorised fees has been a problem in the 
health sector in Ghana.23,55,56 Our study revealed that some 
health providers only pursue their parochial interests and not 
the achievement of NHIS’ goals. Our findings thus illuminate 
the observation that corruption undermines achievement of 
public policy goals.57 
Service Delivery Challenges at the District Health Insurance 
Schemes
Inadequate office accommodation, equipment and materials 
undermined the efficient functioning of DHISs. They were 
unable to deliver NHIS cards to their clients promptly. It was 
common to see many clients waiting for hours at the DHIS 
offices to get their NHIS cards. A DHIS staff explained: 
“Inadequate equipment and registration materials make it 
difficult for us to deliver the cards to clients promptly.” 
Community members on their part expressed worry about 
the delay in getting their cards. I engaged some people I met 
in DHISs’ offices looking frustrated in a conversation. One of 
them told me: “This is the second time I’m coming here without 
getting my card. I continue to pay at the hospital because of the 
delay.” This study thus shows that service delivery challenges 
do not only frustrate DHIS staff but also discourage people 
from enrolling and remaining in the NHIS. 
The ongoing biometric registration to replace the old system 
is expected to introduce efficiency into the process but it 
seems not to solve the problem of delay in getting NHIS cards. 
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Anecdotal reports and my observation reveal that people still 
wait in long queues to register and do not sometimes get the 
cards immediately as expected due to inadequate equipment 
and shortage of materials. 
Healthcare Service Delivery Challenges
The assumption that the NHIS will improve quality of service 
was not evident. Health providers’ heavy workload and 
shortage of drugs on the NHI Drug List at health facilities 
undermined the quality of service. 
Heavy Workload and Long Waiting Time
Many people, who had no access to formal care or cut their 
treatment short because of user-fees,1-4 have access now. 
Though an improvement in utilisation is desirable, it has 
increased health providers’ workload. We found that the NHIS 
was implemented within an overburdened health system 
without adequate resources to handle the growing patient 
numbers. Patients waiting for hours at health facilities was a 
common sight. Insured patients argued that they anticipate 
prompt treatment, but they were rather made to wait longer 
than the uninsured. Their common complaint at busy health 
facilities was: “Health providers make us wait while they 
attend to those who pay cash.” Our survey results confirmed 
these assertions. The majority (75.8%) currently insured and 
(68.8%) previously insured respondents said they expect 
prompt treatment at health facilities. These results clearly 
show that health facilities are arenas of social relations that 
affect not only clients’ well-being58 but also health insurance 
decision making. 
Health providers were divided on the genuineness of insured 
patients’ complaints. A District Director of Health Services’ 
(DDHSs) argued: “Many more people come to the hospital and 
we spend time filling forms for insured patients; prolonging the 
time spent treating them. They don’t realise this and complain 
about delays.” There were others who, though acknowledged 
the increased workload, admitted insured patients’ concerns. 
One of them said: “These complaints are genuine. Some of us 
see insured patients as giving us extra work and give preference 
to uninsured patients.”
Generally, clinicians are used to hurriedly writing a few words 
so the additional task of filling the NHIS form, psychologically 
drew negative reaction towards insured patients. Some were 
hostile to insured patients; others collected unofficial fees or 
demanded cash payments to avoid filling the forms. 
Shortage of Drugs on National Health Insurance Drugs List 
Shortage of drugs on the NHI Drug List undermine health 
providers’ desire to provide quality service to insured patients. 
Health providers attributed the shortage to delays in claim 
payment which was expected to be within four weeks after 
claim submission to DHISs but this does not happen. A PA 
described the delay in payment as follows: “Only 60% of April 
bill was paid in August and the remaining 40% this month 
[September]. I don’t know when May bill will be paid. All these 
make it impossible to meet patients’ drug needs.” 
Insured patients on their part, expressed their dissatisfaction 
of roaming looking for accredited pharmacy shops to obtain 
prescribed drugs covered by the NHIS which they sometimes 
pay for as follows: “We go around looking for prescribed drugs 
which we often pay for. Since we enrolled to avoid paying money 
when sick, these payments discourage us from renewing our 
membership.” Our survey results corroborate these complaints. 
About 83.7% of insured respondents and 90.3% of previously 
insured agreed to the statement that availability of drugs at 
health facilities should be improved (Table 6).
These results illustrate a significant misunderstanding 
regarding what insured patients, health providers and policy 
makers thought would stimulate enrolment and retain 
members. Health facilities anticipated prompt payment of 
claims to enable them meet insured patients’ drug needs. 
Insured patients expect to receive all prescribed drugs at 
health facilities while policy-makers thought accredited shops 
could augment drug shortages at health facilities. 
Provision of drugs has been established to be critical in the 
appreciation of service delivery. Van der Geest et al write: 
“Medical practitioners see pharmaceuticals as indispensable in 
their encounter with sick people... patients and their relatives 
expect medicines to solve their problems.”59 This study also 
shows that drugs are a critical component of quality service 
and its shortage in health facilities increased dissatisfaction 
among insured patients. This contradicts policy makers’ 
assumption that the NHIS will improve quality of healthcare 
and indicate that SHISs do not automatically lead to quality 
service. This study thus supports the finding that health 
insurance has weak or no effect on quality of service60 and 
that patients’ satisfaction about the quality of care determines 
the degree of participation in health insurance.61 
Politics and Enrolment in the National Health Insurance 
Scheme
Social health insurance generates fierce political debates at 
international, national and local levels. In Ghana, the NHIS’s 
political stake was very high during policy making and the 
initial stage of implementation.62 Though, the political furor 
disappeared from public discourse after its introduction, it 
still persists in subtle ways among national level stakeholders. 
Participants who were NPP (the party in government) and 
NDC (the main opposition party) sympathisers mentioned 
that their decision to enrol or not to enrol was influenced 
by the politics that surrounded NHIS’ introduction but this 
changed later. An NDC supporter said: 
“I didn’t register when insurance was introduced because of 
politics. The NPP said all kinds of things about NDC who 
first brought the idea. Though NDC could not implement 
health insurance, they should credit them for introducing the 
idea.”
One of the NPP sympathisers also explained why people 
were not enrolling in the NHIS as follows: “Don’t mind NDC 
supporters they thought that the NHIS will die when a new 
government comes to power. Now they are registering because it 
benefits them.” Nobody mentioned that he did not have a valid 
NHIS card because of politics. 
However, national level key informants (staff of the MoH 
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and GHS) were concerned that politics is undermining the 
effective collaboration needed to develop efficient systems 
to improve quality of service, stimulate enrolment and retain 
people in the NHIS. A GHS staff reacted to community 
members’ and health providers’ complaints as follows: “These 
complaints are true. It is because we [MoH, GHS and the NHIA] 
are not meeting to develop systems to improve service delivery.” 
The MoH staff I spoke with confirmed health providers’ 
complaints and argued that:
“The biggest challenge we face is that the NHIA doesn’t share 
information. Even now that the politics that surrounded 
NHIS’ introduction is over, they still do not effectively engage 
us [MoH and GHS] to build systems to improve service 
delivery. They take decsions and inform us later.”
The NHIA staff also responded to these complaints as follows:
“The NHIS is pro-poor. The premiums is low enough for 
all Ghanaians to enrol. Exemptions are also provided. But, 
health providers’ corrupt practices result in delays in claims 
reimbursement and shortage of drugs. Enrolment could be 
improved if facilities help in the efficient management of their 
stock levels and service providers improve their attitudes 
towards insured patients.”
Responding to the question why the NHIA does not share 
information and meet regularly with the MoH and DHS 
officials, Another staff replied: “They read politics into 
whatever we do. We inform them about what we do. They 
delay payment of claims is to ensure that claims are thoroughly 
checked.”
A critical analysis of these comments and previous studies 
reveal that the NHIS is highly centralised; involvement 
of stakeholders and technocrats in the implementation is 
minimal.7,60 and the checks and balances needed to address 
gaps was often missing. As Brinkerhoff observes after 
analysing the US health system, effective engagement of 
stakeholders ensures accountability and helps reveal gaps that 
require intervention to improve service delivery63 However, in 
the case of Ghana, effective collaboration among stakeholders 
to ensure independent decision making and development of 
efficient systems is often sacrificed for political actors control 
of the NHIS.
Also, the politics of the NHIS came up four years into NHIS’ 
implementation when the opposition NDC also made two 
pledges in its manifesto for the next general elections in 2008 
as follows: 
“Our universal health insurance scheme will guarantee 
access to free healthcare in all public health institutions. 
It will not be district-specific and will allow for one-time 
premium payment (OTPP).”64,65
Upon resumming office in January 2009, the government was 
able to nationalise the NHIS card and the insured now access 
healthcare in every accredited facility irrespective of where 
they registered. The OTPP which means that individuals will 
pay premium once in their life time implies the elimination 
of annual premium, was fiercely debated and its implications 
for NHIS’ long term financial sustainability questioned. The 
government on his part argued that the high cost of premium 
collection from the informal sector can be surmounted and 
access expanded. Abiiro and Mcintyre observe: 
“Though the OTPP potentially can lead to increases in 
NHIS coverage, especially within the informal sector... 
sustainability will largely depend on how it is designed.... 
The government and the policy drivers need to... examine 
its feasibility and long-term sustainability within the current 
Ghanaian economic context.”66 
The considerable controversy generated about OTPP’s 
implication for NHIS’ long term sustainability gradually 
disappeared from public discourse possibly due to lack 
of a policy document in the public domain to justify its 
contribution to achieving NHIS’ goals. 
Limitation of the Study
The study covered two regions in Southern Ghana. Since the 
socio-economic and cultural differences between the South 
and the North might affect health insurance decision making 
differently, our conclusions should be interpreted with 
caution.
Conclusion 
The study revealed that the NHIS’ implementation arena is 
littered with multi-dimensional factors located at multiple 
levels. People enrolled because of NHIS’ benefits and positive 
health provider-patient interaction. Apart from the core poor 
and poor households with many dependants, poverty was 
not a reason for not enrolling in the NHIS and renewing 
membership, instead, the negative influence of traditional 
risk-sharing arrangements, corruption, shortage of drugs, and 
politics are the serious challenges that need to be addressed. 
We thus suggest the following interventions to improve 
enrolment and retention rates in the NHIS. 
The evidence that insurance reduces medical complications, 
but inundated with corruption, requires the establishment 
of a national health system free of cash transaction and all 
residents in Ghana compelled to belong to a health insurance 
scheme. The compulsory enrolment would be acceptable 
if the NHIS resonates with quality care and makes it easier 
and faster for the insured to access healthcare and not 
the reverse. This requires that the NHIA engage local and 
national stakeholders to create systems that improve service 
delivery, prompt payment of claims to enable health facilities 
meet insured patients’ drug requirements and stop corrupt 
practices. Also, the government should resource DHISs 
adequately to enable them deliver NHIS cards promptly to 
make NHIS attractive to both the rich and the poor. Above all, 
the politics that erupts after every election should be stopped 
by appointing NHIA’s chief executive as a public servant and 
not a political appointee who leaves office when there is a 
change in government. These measures could move NHIS 
towards the universal coverage that was announced in 2004. 
Finally, we propose more qualitative study to explore further 
the effect of traditional mutual support arrangements and 
shortage of drugs on enrolment and retention in health 
insurance.
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Endnotes
[1] User-fees refer to OOPPs for some healthcare services at the point of 
utilisation.
[2] Cash and carry led to OOPP for full cost of drugs in public health facilities. 
It was a WHO and UNICEF initiative adopted by African Health Ministers in 
Bamako, Mali, in 1987. The policy was expected to improve drug supplies in 
public health facilities. 
[3] Social Security and National Insurance (SSNIT) is a government pension 
scheme in Ghana that most formal sector workers and their employers 
contribute to. 
[4] CHPS zone is a national programme of community-based care provided 
by resident nurses who are referred to as community health officers. CHPS, 
introduced in 1999, reduces geographical barriers to access to healthcare and 
provides basic level preventive and curative services for minor ailments at the 
community and household levels. 
[5] Etic account is a description of a phenomenon in terms of its meaning to the 
observing outsider. 
[6] Emic perspectives means describing behaviours and understandings in terms 
of meaningful experiences to the actor. 
[7] Pataase is an association of mostly fishermen who come together to support 
each other in times of economic stress. They provide financial assistance to 
members. Their main focus is funeral costs of members or their close relatives. 
[8] Nnoboa (support weeding) is a mutual help group. The name refers to local 
support networks formed by farmers to support each other on their farms. In 
these groups, trust and commitment to achieve individual and group objectives 
is the key principle.
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